§1 Report sheetMAP-0356 / Sample report

from the alert to a revoked token
Client | Consumer lending app |
Map area | Pipelines |
Scope | GitHub Actions, 6 AWS accounts |
Findings | 1 Critical, 3 High, 12 Low |
Result | Token revoked in 9 minutes |
Written for the team that did the work. The client is fictional and the name is withheld.
The team connected GitHub Actions and six AWS accounts so the map could read which roles their builds can step into. It reads settings, never logs.
A debug step printed a deploy token into a build log that the whole engineering team could read. GitHub secret scanning raised the alert, the team passed it on, and the map showed that the token reached production.
It was revoked nine minutes after the alert. Deploys now use a short-lived token per job, and logs are checked for secrets.
§3 TimelineMAP-0356 / Sample report
Sample timeline, taken from the map history. Every action has a time.
When | Step | By |
10:02 | GitHub secret scanning alert passed to the shared channel | Client team |
10:03 | Named engineer posts what the token can reach, from the map | Named engineer |
10:05 | Token owner confirmed | Client team |
10:08 | Build log removed | Client team |
10:11 | Token revoked, path gone from the map | Client team |
After the fix | ||
Day 2 | No use of the token found in the team's own provider logs | Client team |
Day 6 | Deploys moved to a short-lived token per job | Client team |
Day 14 | Log check added to every pipeline | Client team |
§4 FindingsMAP-0356 / Sample report
Severity | Finding | Closed |
Critical | Exposed deploy token with a path to production | 9 min |
High | Token valid for all six accounts | Day 6 |
High | Fork builds could read repository secrets | Day 9 |
The other 13 stay in the client's copy.

§5 Client noteMAP-0356 / Sample report
It was nine minutes, and most of that was finding the person who owned it. Now every token has a name on it.
Short-lived tokens per job
Logs checked for secrets
Fork builds hold no secrets
§6 More reportsEnd of MAP-0356