{"id":32,"date":"2026-10-28T09:00:00","date_gmt":"2026-10-28T09:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/demo.goodlayers.com\/wardline\/homepages\/intel\/what-a-stolen-session-token-still-buys\/"},"modified":"2026-11-01T14:36:08","modified_gmt":"2026-11-01T14:36:08","slug":"what-a-stolen-session-token-still-buys","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/demo.goodlayers.com\/wardline\/homepages\/intel\/what-a-stolen-session-token-still-buys\/","title":{"rendered":"What a stolen session token still buys"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>Multi-factor stopped the password. It did nothing about the cookie that came after it. Once a person has signed in, the browser holds a session token, and whoever holds that token is that person until it expires.<\/p>\n<p>Most of the cases on our desk this year started this way. Nobody cracked anything. A proxy page sat between the user and the real sign-in, passed the code along, and kept the token that came back.<\/p>\n<h2>What the token opens<\/h2>\n<p>It depends on how long your sessions last and what they can reach. In a sample week of testing on our own lab tenant, one token gave us the following, with no further prompt.<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>The mailbox, including rules and delegates.<\/li>\n<li>Shared files the user could already open.<\/li>\n<li>The admin portal, if the user was an administrator.<\/li>\n<li>A way to register a new device, which outlives the token.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<blockquote><p>The password was never the prize. The session was.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<h2>What changes the answer<\/h2>\n<p>Shorter sessions for administrators help. So does binding sessions to a managed device. Hardware keys help most, because the key checks the address of the page and a proxy page fails that check.<\/p>\n<p>When we respond, we revoke sessions before we reset passwords. Resetting a password does not end a session on every platform, and that gap is often where an attacker stays.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Multi-factor stopped the password. It did nothing about the cookie that came after it.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":12,"featured_media":18,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[3,4],"class_list":["post-32","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-threat-research","tag-field-notes","tag-home-list"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/demo.goodlayers.com\/wardline\/homepages\/intel\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/32","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/demo.goodlayers.com\/wardline\/homepages\/intel\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/demo.goodlayers.com\/wardline\/homepages\/intel\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/demo.goodlayers.com\/wardline\/homepages\/intel\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/12"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/demo.goodlayers.com\/wardline\/homepages\/intel\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=32"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/demo.goodlayers.com\/wardline\/homepages\/intel\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/32\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":97,"href":"https:\/\/demo.goodlayers.com\/wardline\/homepages\/intel\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/32\/revisions\/97"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/demo.goodlayers.com\/wardline\/homepages\/intel\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/18"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/demo.goodlayers.com\/wardline\/homepages\/intel\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=32"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/demo.goodlayers.com\/wardline\/homepages\/intel\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=32"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/demo.goodlayers.com\/wardline\/homepages\/intel\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=32"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}